civilization does, and wrong as that which deviates from the general pat tern of behavior. The rule of convention is seen at its best in what inthropologists call folk societies. Such societies have achieved a high de gree of harmonious unconscious adjustment of part to part. There are minorities, many special-interest and specialization has not caused. great disorganization. Almost all members participate fully in the culture of the whole group. In such harmonious sucieties, it cannot be denied, convention is a most successful guarantor of order and cohesion. Where almost all people participate fully in the general culture, almost all children will be reared and conditioned to have the same desires and to be satisfied by the same approved social institutions which their society has evolved to meet those desires. The rule of convention will thus assure the greatest happiness to the largest number. Some folk societies will feel justified in ruthlessly liquidating all deviant behavior as a threat to the cohesion of the whole. Others will ingeniously find room within the existing institutions to assimilate deviant members (as, for example those Siberian tribes who assign to epileptics and homosexuals the role of holy men, or those American Indian tribes who permit some male homosexuals to adopt the dress and role of women.)

But ours is not a harmonious folk society. Its members do not participate fully in any majority culture. Its parents do not uniformly raise and condition their children to desires which can assuredly be met by the existing institutions. On the contrary, our society is ethically committed to a recognition of the rightto-deviate of its individual members. And its complexity and disorganization constantly encourage the production of deviant behavior patterns

which, again, it is ethically commit-

ted to tolerate. For this reason I would reject convention as socially inappropriate and philosophically inadequate to answer the question before us. Our society is committed to explaining its concepts of goodness and justice in the light of knowledge Why should we not be similarly committed?

Third, IDEALISTIC REASONING. This mode of thought differs from religion in that it rejects authoritarian dogma and bases its conclusions upon observation. But it also differs from scientific or pragmatic thinking in that it is often willing to leap beyond sensory data to highly abstract or higly imaginative conclusions, which it then erects into dogmas. Idealistic thinkers usually operate by attempting to surmise the purpose of human life (e.g., to evolve to perfection, complete consciousness, unity with the Universe, God, etc.) and then to define good as that which accords with or furthers the purpose of life, and evil as that which hinders it. Though often noble and beautiful in its exercise of the "highest" and "finest" reaches of Man's imagination, idealism is a risky basis upon which to erect a moral system before all the facts are known and tested. Its grand visions may be liable at any moment to be shattered by newly discovered matters of fact, and its moral dogmas would topple at the same time.

Fourth, PRAGMATIC REASONING, which deals only with verifiable matters of fact, forms no premature hypotheses, makes no assumptions about the nature of the universe, and in general tests all truth by its workability rather than its desirability. These characteristics make it singularly appropriate as an instrument for inquiring into a subject as new and relatively uninves-

mattachine REVIEW

tigated as the present one.

For instance,, if we examine the conventional heterosexual morality of our civilization in the light of pragmatic thinking, we find in it, quite aside from the sanctions of religion, convention, and idealism, a sound practical basis. The human species is characterized by a particularly long period of helplessness and immaturity relatively to the other mammals, a period during which it is entirely dependent upon its parents, not only for its physical survival, but for its emotional and intellectual development. It is thus understandable that any stable social organization based upon the family unit should invent aimed at insuring that each child shall have two parents to see him through to maturity. Hence the legal, conventional,, and religious bond of marriage, and the prohibition of heterosexual intercourse until both parties have pledged themselves to remain together for their entire lives. Hence, also the prohibition of adultery, as a threat to the stability of the parental relationship. Of course, the invention and dissemination of contraceptives has removed much of the pragmatic basis of heterosexual morality. And there are undeniable signs that new heterosexual mores are developing in accordance with these new factors, despite the fact that the traditional mores are still stoutly supported by religion, convention, and idealism. To those who are not deterred by the strictures against fornication on the grounds that it is a sin and a crime, the idealistic argument is still often The new post-Freudian cogent. idealism speaks a most appealing language. Human sexuality, it says, is not merely a provocative, biological function, but an emotional; spiritual (psychic) one, stemming from the need of every one of us to love

and be loved, to know another and to be known by another. The purpose of marriage is thus that two people should, through a lifetime of emotional, physical, intellectual and spiritual sharing, come to be aware of each other's existence as separate beings, and this is conceivable only in a monogamous relationship..

Perhaps most people are influenced to some degree or other by more than one of the aforementioned sources of moral convictions. At the level where the choice is between an idealistic and a pragmatic view, I can see no difference between the moral problem of the homosexual and that of the unmarried, or childless heterosexual, And, indeed, my opponent on this panel pictures for us a moral homosexual relationship which is in perfect imitation of heterosexual marriage of the childless, companionate, idealistic variety. This idealistic picture is most appealing. But I feel the incipient dogmatism behind my opponent's covert suggestion that this is the only conceivable moral sexual relationship between two people, for pragmati, cally, I do not understand why it should be. The only pragmatic stric, ture upon human actions of any kind that is cogent to me is that they shall do no harm (physical or psychic) to others, individually or collectively, and I doubt that monogamous marriage has about it such an antiseptic sanctity that it can render moral all the bonds of relationship which it often cloaks. We have all known people to whom surface love is an instrument of domination, or venge, or compulsive possessiveness, and we wonder for what purpose marriage should be recommended to them. And we wonder in what sense, except the religious and the conventional, their marriages could possibly be called 15

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